Howard v. Howard

Howard v. Howard

336 S.W.3d 433 (Ky. 2011)

Roy Shane Howard and Sondra Howard. Trial Court divided parties marital property and debts assigning Shane liability for a National City loan on the parties’ Dodge Durango. Shane successfully filed in fed court a bankruptcy petition for Chapter 7 discharge.

Sought to reduced child support obligation, claiming health problems, inability to find work and the bankruptcy he received. Sondra found he was in contempt of court for failure to pay the debt on the repossessed Durango. Appeal as with bankruptcy. Appeals court found that under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which does not discharge the debtor from any debt “to a spouse, former spouse or child” for something other than a domestic support obligation.” Shane appealed.

As the Court of Appeals states, Shane had the obligation under the divorce decree but the issue whether this debt would not be subject to discharge under the requirements of 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(15) as a debt to Sondra under the divorce decree. They found that the obligation did indeed meet the rquirements and that Sondra was not required to file anything in bankruptcy court regarding the Chapter 7 filing in order to preserve her right to enforce in state court of Shane’s obligation to her under the divorce decree.

The Court ended up finding that while the debtor’s obligation on an underlying debt to a third-party creditor may be discharged because that underlying debt was not to a spouse or former spouse or child, the weight of authority holds that a separate, otherwise enforceable, obligation under a divorce decree to make payments on a third-party debt is not dischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy following the BAPCPA amendments.

Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris

Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris

61 A.2d 11146 (1995) 

Facts. Nancy Harris was president of the plaintiff corporation, Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. from 1971 to 1990 when she was forced to resign. Over time, Nancy purchased parcels of land surrounding the golf course in her name and informed the directors and other officers at the annual meetings. In 1988, Harris began the process of obtaining a five-lot subdivision and NE brought a suit for breach of fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation. Main Issue: Corporate Opportunity. NE sought an injunction to prevent development and also to impose a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of the Club. The DC found Harris had not usurped the corporate opportunity b/c her good faith acquisition of real estate was not in the Club’s line of business and that the club lacked financial ability to purchase that real estate. 

Issue. Did the DC err in finding that Harris did not breach her fiduciary duty as president of the Club by purchasing and developing the property around the golf course?

Held. Yes, the trial court’s “line of business test” was erroneous and should’ve followed ALI §5.05 standards, so it was vacated and remanded. Harris should’ve fully disclosed to the board and the club must have rejected it properly. Because Harris failed to offer the opportunity at all, she couldn’t’ defend her case.

 

 

Lewis Galoob Toys Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.

Lewis Galoob Toys Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.

964 F.2d 965 (9^th Cir. 1992) 

Facts. Appellant Nintendo marked a home video game system. For using the game, the player had to insert a cartridge which contained a video game produced by them or licensed to others to produce. The Game Genie was manufactured by Appellee Lewis Galoob Toys that allowed the player to alter defendant’s games. The player was able to control the changes by entering codes that were provided by the Game Genie Programming Manual and Code Book. Appellant filed suit for copyright infringement and an injunction to enjoin the marketing of Game Genie. The DC held that there was no violation of copyright by Galoob.

Issue. Was the DC correct in holding that Game Genie did not violate the copyright of Nintendo?

Held. Yes, the DC was correct in it’s holding. This holding is used for fair use analysis because of it’s dicta, such as in Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.

Nguyen v. INS

Nguyen v INS

2001

Facts. 28 USC § 1409 governs US citizenship for a child born to citizen and non-citizen and parents are unmarried and the child is born outside of US and territories. There are different requirements for mother who is a citizen vs a father who is a citizen.

If the father is the citizen he has three options, a) legitimation; b) declaration of paternity under oath; c) or a court order of paternity. Mother does not have to do these things. The government interest is to ensure a biological parent-child relationship exists and to ensure the child and citizen parent have demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized by law but also that has real, everyday ties that provide a connection between the two and between the child and the United States, since obviously a citizen will show how great America is to the kid.

 

Issue. Do the means of imposing additional requirements, by § 1049, upon an unwed citizen father that are not opposed to the same status mother substantially related to the government’s interest?

 

Held. Yes, there is no need to impose these upon the mother because she will obviously be there at birth. One can guarantee that she will be with the child and will have the chance to develop a meaningful relationship with him or her. Proof of motherhood is inherent in birth.

Petitioners argue that just because a woman gives birth to a baby doesn’t mean she’ll have a meaningful relationship with him or her.

An important note is that the level is scrutiny is lowered because immigration deals with national security and there is more deference to the other branches of government for that.

Lannan v. State

Lannan v. State

590 N.E.2d 668

Facts. Appellant was twenty-three years old at the time he was arrested; victim was fourteen. Appellant was charged w/ molestation and the jury that eventually convicted  him was allowed to hear testimony from the victim, as well as from another alleged victim who claimed Appellant had molested her in the past. Both victims testified that Appellant had molested both of them in his truck in the past. The current victim also testified that she had had sex with Appellant on at least three other instances. Under prior Indiana precedent, in prosecution for “incest, sodomy, criminal deviate conduct or child molesting,” evidence of prior sexual conduct was allowed under the “depraved sexual instinct exception.” Lanna appealed his conviction, arguing for an abandonment of the Indiana rule. 

Issue. Should the Indiana common law “depraved sexual instinct exception” be abandoned in favor of the standard set by FRE 404(b) which provides, that evidence of uncharged prior bad acts are not admissible?

Held. Yes, the rule should be abandoned and FRE 404(b) be adopted. The opinion stressed that the new rule does not mean that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible, but rather that it “means only that such evidence will no longer be admitted to show action in conformity with a particular character trait” (the propensity box)

Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson

Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson

283 U.S. 697 (1931)

Facts. In 1927, Minnesota passed a law prohibiting the publication of any newspaper, periodical or magazine that was “malicious, scandalous and  defamatory or obscene, lewd and lascivious.” Anyone who distributed such materials was prohibited from continuing production and was charged with creating a public nuisance. In late 1927, the Petitioner published several articles in The Saturday  Press what indicated that the law enforcement was not “energetically” pursuing the head of the mob. The Petitioner was then forced to stop production. This was serious article about the failures of law enforcement.

Prior restraint at issue: subject to prosecution for publishing malicious content. Enjoined from all publishing. There’s a chilling effect from this kind of prior restraint.

Issue. Is a court order enjoining a publisher from producing a magazine a prior restraint in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of press?

Rule. The government may not censor expression in advance under 1^st Amendment.

Held. Yes. To allow the court to enjoin the activity without providing the publisher an opportunity to show that the matter is true, is a step toward total censorship of the press.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

524 U.S. 569

Facts. The Petitioner is a federal agency that provides funding for the arts. It requires the Chairperson to ensure that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which grant applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” NEA has the ultimate authority to grant funding for projects, but cannot approve anything the advisory council rejects. In 1989, two provocative works prompted pubic controversy leading to the reevaluation of the project selection process. Consequently, Congress adopted a law that made NEA consider the “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse values of the American public.” NEA petitioned.

Issue. Is the new law invalid on its face and therefore a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech?

Rule. A law is facially valid as long as it doesn’t suppress disfavored viewpoints.

Held. No. This law is constitutional as it doesn’t interfere with freedom of speech and it’s not overly vague. Content-based not viewpoint based restriction. Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nat

Alderstein v. Wertheimer

Alderstein v. Wertheimer

Del. Ct. Ch.

2002 WL 205865

 

Facts. Alderstein, who was former Chairman and CEO of SpectruMedix Corp. sued the company and the current directors. Prior to the suit on July 9, 2001, a meeting was held in which a board majority issued to a Reich Partnership a number of shares of a new class of supervoting preferred stock that conveyed to the Reich Partnership a majority of the voting power of the Company’s stock. Basically Alderstein sued Wertheimer and Mencher because they did not give notice of a meeting that would result in his removal from his CEO position.

 

Rule. Company’s insolvency doesn’t justify not giving advance notice of a meeting’s agenda.

 

Issue: Did SpectruMedix’s dire financial circumstance and actual or impending insolvency justify directors’ actions in not giving advance notice of meeting to prevent controlling shareholder from exercising rights?

 

Held. No. SpecturMedix’s dire financial situation and impending insolvency does not justify Wertheimer’s and Mencher’s actions. It is such times of dire consequence when the established rules of good board conduct are the most important. Directors cannot accomplish their fiduciary duties to a corporations though trickery and deceit. 

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

Michael H. v. Gerald D.
504 US 905

Facts . In 1975 Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in California and resided together. In 1978, Carole started to have an affair with Michael H. Carole then conceived a child, Victoria, in 1980, with Gerald, which was listed as father on the birth certificate. Gerald held that Victoria was his child, but then after delivery Carole informed Michael that he might be the father. In 1981, blood tests showed that Michael was the father to the 98.07 percentile. Carole visited Michael and resided with another man in California, since Gerald had moved to New York. In the summer of 1982, Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York and the three vacationed in Europe. That fall she flew back to California, and in November, Michael filed an action in CA to establish paternity and right to visit. In 1983 the court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Victoria. She filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship with all of the attendants rights, duties, obligations with both.
Carole filed for summary judgment while she was living with Gerald and in August, she returned to California and again became involved with Michael, instructing her attorneys to remove the summary judgment motion. For the next eight months Michael held Victoria out as his daughter. Then in April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation that he was Victoria’s father. That next month, she left Michael, instructing her attorneys not to file the stipulation. Carole reconciled with Geraldnd and they lived together with two more children being born.
In May 1984 Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael. A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole custody, but Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visiation schedule. The court concurred. In October of 1984 Gerland moved for summary judgment on ground that under California law there was no triable issue of fact as to Victoria’s paternity. The law said: “the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” The presumption may only be rebutted by blood test, and a motion for such tests must be made within two years of birth by the husband, or by the wife if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent.

Issue. Does the presumption established by the law infringe upon the due process rights of a man who wishes to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man or infringe upon the constitutional right of the child to maintain a relationship with her father?

Rule. An adulterous biological father does not have a constitutional right to paternity over a marital father.

Held. Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship. The Court declines to accept that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood because Victoria was not illegitimate since she has a father.

U.S. v. Mound

U.S. v. Mound
525 U.S. 1089

Facts. Defendant (D) was accused of sexually assaulting his daughter for a period of four years, beginning when she was ten. D was convicted by a jury, of seven sexual abuse and assault charges, and was sentenced to life in prison. Before the occurrences of this case, D was accused by two other young women of abuse. D pled guilty to the first offense in exchange for 2nd charge being dropped.
Evidence of conviction of D and evidence relating to the uncharged crime were offered by the prosecution; the lower court admitted into evidence the conviction only, excluding the evidence related to the uncharged crime.

Issue. Is FRE 413 unconstitutional because it punishes people for past acts?
Is FRE 413 unconstitutional as applied because it violates D’s equal protection rights?
Is it an error to enter the evidence of the past assaults under Rule 413 following a FRE 403?

Rule. Courts must apply 403 to all evidence offered.

Held. The Court affirmed. No; Congress has the ultimate power to create exceptions to the FRE it creates, and Rule 413 is essentially an exception to the past practice of excluding evidence of prior bad acts. The Rule bears a rational relation to some legitimate end and Congress’s judgment in enacting the Rule was rational.
No; there were two alleged past acts, and the court properly applied the Rule 403 test and, in its discretion, determined to allow into evidence the prior conviction, but not allow testimony concerning the uncharged crime. According to the legislative history of 413, the rule was intended to have the effect of allowing certain evidence that would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The court reasons that the “cautionary instruction” to the jury guarded against unfair prejudice.