Nguyen v. INS

Nguyen v INS

2001

Facts. 28 USC § 1409 governs US citizenship for a child born to citizen and non-citizen and parents are unmarried and the child is born outside of US and territories. There are different requirements for mother who is a citizen vs a father who is a citizen.

If the father is the citizen he has three options, a) legitimation; b) declaration of paternity under oath; c) or a court order of paternity. Mother does not have to do these things. The government interest is to ensure a biological parent-child relationship exists and to ensure the child and citizen parent have demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized by law but also that has real, everyday ties that provide a connection between the two and between the child and the United States, since obviously a citizen will show how great America is to the kid.

 

Issue. Do the means of imposing additional requirements, by § 1049, upon an unwed citizen father that are not opposed to the same status mother substantially related to the government’s interest?

 

Held. Yes, there is no need to impose these upon the mother because she will obviously be there at birth. One can guarantee that she will be with the child and will have the chance to develop a meaningful relationship with him or her. Proof of motherhood is inherent in birth.

Petitioners argue that just because a woman gives birth to a baby doesn’t mean she’ll have a meaningful relationship with him or her.

An important note is that the level is scrutiny is lowered because immigration deals with national security and there is more deference to the other branches of government for that.

Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson

Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson

283 U.S. 697 (1931)

Facts. In 1927, Minnesota passed a law prohibiting the publication of any newspaper, periodical or magazine that was “malicious, scandalous and  defamatory or obscene, lewd and lascivious.” Anyone who distributed such materials was prohibited from continuing production and was charged with creating a public nuisance. In late 1927, the Petitioner published several articles in The Saturday  Press what indicated that the law enforcement was not “energetically” pursuing the head of the mob. The Petitioner was then forced to stop production. This was serious article about the failures of law enforcement.

Prior restraint at issue: subject to prosecution for publishing malicious content. Enjoined from all publishing. There’s a chilling effect from this kind of prior restraint.

Issue. Is a court order enjoining a publisher from producing a magazine a prior restraint in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of press?

Rule. The government may not censor expression in advance under 1^st Amendment.

Held. Yes. To allow the court to enjoin the activity without providing the publisher an opportunity to show that the matter is true, is a step toward total censorship of the press.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

524 U.S. 569

Facts. The Petitioner is a federal agency that provides funding for the arts. It requires the Chairperson to ensure that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which grant applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” NEA has the ultimate authority to grant funding for projects, but cannot approve anything the advisory council rejects. In 1989, two provocative works prompted pubic controversy leading to the reevaluation of the project selection process. Consequently, Congress adopted a law that made NEA consider the “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse values of the American public.” NEA petitioned.

Issue. Is the new law invalid on its face and therefore a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech?

Rule. A law is facially valid as long as it doesn’t suppress disfavored viewpoints.

Held. No. This law is constitutional as it doesn’t interfere with freedom of speech and it’s not overly vague. Content-based not viewpoint based restriction. Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nat

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

536 U.S. 765 (2002) 

Facts. Minnesota holds non-partisan elections for its judges. Since 1974, candidates have not been allowed to announce their  current legal or political views during the election period. Incumbent judges who violate this rule “are subject to discipline, including removal, censure, civil penalties, and suspension without pay.” Non-incumbent candidates can be disbarred, put on probation or suspended. One of the petitioners, during his campaign, distributed literature critical of some Minnesota Supreme Court cases. He withdrew form that election, but decided to run again in a later election.

Content neutrality. Content based or viewpoint based. Bad to decide what speech is okay based on its content. 

Issue. Does the 1^st Amendment permit a state to prohibit judicial election candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

 

Held. No, reversed. The 9^th Circuits opinion is not all that it appears to be. The Court of Appeals concluded that the strict-scrutiny test applies here because the clause burdens a core category of 1^st Amendment speech and prohibits speech based on content. The respondents did not dispute this was the correct test.

The test requires that the rule:

1) narrowly tailored, to serve

2) compelling state interest.

Respondent claim the announce clause is justified by state interests of preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance that the state judiciary is impartial. However, impartiality is vague and undefined.

There could be several meanings of impartiality. First, impartiality, by its traditionally meaning, ensures the law is applied equally, such that there is no bias for or against either party. This clause does not narrowly, but instead barely, serves this purpose by restricting speech for against particular issues, not parties, When a party takes a stance on an issue opposite to judge’s stance, that party is likely to lose even though the judge feels that he is applying the law equally. Second, impartiality could perhaps be construed to mean lack of preconception in favor of a legal view, such that litigants are guaranteed equal opportunity to persuade a judge. However, avoiding judicial preconception on legal is issues is not possible nor desirable (a judge without opinions on constitutional issues would lack qualification). Third, impartiality could mean open-mindedness, such that a judge will consider views that oppose his preconceptions. However, statements in campaigns are such a miniscule proportion of legal positions they have committed to. Additionally, they may express their views on legal issues in other venues such as classes, books or speeches, which are not covered by the clause, which make this view incredible.

The idea that elections justify  inhibiting the right to speak is against the first amendment. Debates on candidate’s qualifications and the candidates ‘ ability to express relevant information to voters are of fundamental importance. The Minnesota clause violates the first amendment. 

Dissent. Unlike legislative and executive officials, judicial officers do not cater to their constituencies, but instead decide cases based on individual records, applying the law neutrally, and standing up to the majority’s will when necessary

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

Michael H. v. Gerald D.
504 US 905

Facts . In 1975 Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in California and resided together. In 1978, Carole started to have an affair with Michael H. Carole then conceived a child, Victoria, in 1980, with Gerald, which was listed as father on the birth certificate. Gerald held that Victoria was his child, but then after delivery Carole informed Michael that he might be the father. In 1981, blood tests showed that Michael was the father to the 98.07 percentile. Carole visited Michael and resided with another man in California, since Gerald had moved to New York. In the summer of 1982, Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York and the three vacationed in Europe. That fall she flew back to California, and in November, Michael filed an action in CA to establish paternity and right to visit. In 1983 the court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Victoria. She filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship with all of the attendants rights, duties, obligations with both.
Carole filed for summary judgment while she was living with Gerald and in August, she returned to California and again became involved with Michael, instructing her attorneys to remove the summary judgment motion. For the next eight months Michael held Victoria out as his daughter. Then in April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation that he was Victoria’s father. That next month, she left Michael, instructing her attorneys not to file the stipulation. Carole reconciled with Geraldnd and they lived together with two more children being born.
In May 1984 Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael. A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole custody, but Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visiation schedule. The court concurred. In October of 1984 Gerland moved for summary judgment on ground that under California law there was no triable issue of fact as to Victoria’s paternity. The law said: “the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” The presumption may only be rebutted by blood test, and a motion for such tests must be made within two years of birth by the husband, or by the wife if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.
In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent.

Issue. Does the presumption established by the law infringe upon the due process rights of a man who wishes to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man or infringe upon the constitutional right of the child to maintain a relationship with her father?

Rule. An adulterous biological father does not have a constitutional right to paternity over a marital father.

Held. Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship. The Court declines to accept that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood because Victoria was not illegitimate since she has a father.